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The authors adopt an interdependence analysis of social value orientation, proposing that prosocial,
individualistic, and competitive orientations are (a) partially rooted in different patterns of social
interaction as experienced during the periods spanning early childhood to young adulthood and (b)
further shaped by different patterns of social interaction as experienced during early adulthood, middle
adulthood, and old age. Congruent with this analysis, results revealed that relative to individualists and
competitors, prosocial individuals exhibited greater levels of secure attachment (Studies 1 and 2)
and reported having more siblings, especially sisters (Study 3). Finally, the prevalence of prosocials
increased—and the prevalence of individualists and competitors decreased—from early adulthood
to middle adulthood and old age (Study 4) .
Traditional theories and insights assume that the principle of
rational self-interest or economic man reflects the prevailing
motivation among humankind (Luce & Raiffa, 1957; Von Neu-
man & Morgenstern, 1947; cf. Roth, 1988). However, more
recent theoretical developments have indicated that individuals
systematically differ in the manner in which they approach inter-
dependent others. Some people are inclined to give interdepen-
dent others the benefit of the doubt and approach them coopera-
tively, whereas other people are inclined to approach interdepen-
dent others in a less cooperative manner. Such individual
differences are related to social value orientation, defined as
stable preferences for certain patterns of outcomes for oneself
and others (McClintock, 1978; Messick & McClintock, 1968).
Although a variety of different social value orientations can
be distinguished from a theoretical point of view (e.g., Knight &
Dubro, 1984), in this article we address a three-category typol-
ogy of social value orientation, examining differences between
prosocial, individualistic, and competitive orientations. Prosocials
tend to maximize outcomes for both themselves and others (i.e.,
cooperation) and to minimize differences between outcomes for
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themselves and others (i.e., equality); individualists tend to max-
imize their own outcomes with little or no regard for others'
outcomes; and competitors tend to maximize their own outcomes
relative to others' outcomes, seeking relative advantage over oth-
ers. The three social value orientations are predictive of behavior
in a variety of social dilemma tasks, with prosocials exhibiting
clear tendencies toward cooperation (unless others fail to recipro-
cate), and individualists and competitors exhibiting tendencies
toward maximizing their own and relative gain, even when inter-
dependent others evidence high levels of cooperation (e.g., Kuhl-
man & Marshello, 1975; Liebrand & Van Run, 1985; McClin-
tock & Liebrand, 1988; Sattler & Kerr, 1991; Van Lange & Kuhl-
man, 1994). Moreover, social value orientations are predictive of
helping behavior, judgments of everyday life incidents of coopera-
tion and competition, decisions and judgments regarding commut-
ing choices, and willingness to sacrifice in close relationships
(Beggan, Messick, & Allison, 1988; McClinlock& Allison, 1989;
Van Lange, Agnew. Harinck, & Steemers, in press; Van Vugt,
Meertens, & Van Lange, 1995).
Given that social value orientation accounts for behavior and
interaction patterns in various domains of interdependence, it be-
comes important to ask the obvious: Where do these social value
orientations come from? Could they be, at least in part, a product
of early social experiences? Do these social value orientations
change in any systematic manner over the course of a lifetime?
In the present research, we adopted an interdependence analysis
of social value orientation (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978), proposing
that prosocial, individualistic, and competitive orientations are (a)
partially rooted in different patterns of social interaction as experi-
enced during the periods spanning early childhood to young adult-
hood and (b) further shaped by different patterns of social interac-
tion as experienced during early adulthood, middle adulthood, and
old age. By using interdependence constructs and principles, as
well as empirical research relevant to the development of social
value orientations, we advance several hypotheses regarding the
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relationship between social value orientation and adult attachment
styles (Studies 1 and 2), social value orientation and number of
siblings (Study 3), and social value orientation and age differences
among adults (Study 4).
Interdependence Analysis of Social Value Orientation
The concept of social value orientation reflects distinct ways
in which outcomes for self and others are evaluated, some of
which represent broader considerations that extend and comple-
ment the pursuit of immediate self-interest (e.g., prosocial and
competitive motivation). Interdependence theory has conceptu-
alized such broader considerations in terms of transformation
of motivation, assuming that given interdependence situations
(i.e., the given matrix) are transformed into subjective interde-
pendence situations (i.e., the effective matrix) that ultimately
guide interdependent behavior (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). Such
stable transformational tendencies, at least in part, are assumed
to be shaped by social interaction experiences, which are a
function of the interdependence features of a situation and the
behavior of the two or more persons involved (cf. Kelley, 1997).
For example, the experience of cooperative interaction is a func-
tion of the features of interdependence underlying a situation
(i.e., whether such features permit cooperative and noncoopera-
tive choices, such as in the prisoner's dilemma) and the coopera-
tive behavior exhibited by both persons.
One important interdependence feature of situations that
guides social interaction is the correspondence of outcomes, or
the degree to which preferences correspond versus conflict. A
situation characterized by high correspondence does not permit
cooperative and noncooperative choices, in that a choice serving
one's own interests also lends to serve the other's interests (i.e.,
such situations challenge individuals1 ability to coordinate). A
situation characterized by intermediate correspondence gener-
ally does permit cooperative and noncooperative choices, in that
the pursuit of the other's well-being and joint well-being can
only occur at some cost to one's own well-being. Situations
characterized by perfect noncorrespondence represent a perfect
conflict of interest, such that there is no basis for pursuing joint
well-being. Prior research has revealed that experience with
such situations may shape transformational tendencies. For ex-
ample, individuals tend to develop norms and agreements to
protect their own and others' well-being, particularly when joint
well-being is increasingly challenged by a stronger conflict of
interest (e.g., Thibaut, 1968; Thibaut & Faucheux, 1965).
Transformational tendencies may also be shaped by patterns of
social interaction that are largely conditioned by another person's
behavior. For example, repeated experience with others who tend
to pursue self-interest or relative advantage over others may lead
people to develop an individualistic or competitive orientation
rather than a prosocial orientation. Alternatively, repeated experi-
ence with others who engage in prosocial transformations may
lead people to develop a prosocial orientation. Consistent with
this argument, prior research has revealed that prosocials expect
others to be more cooperative than do individualists and competi-
tors (e.g., Kuhlman & Wimberley, 1976). In a related manner,
individuals' own tendencies to exhibit cooperation or noncoopera-
tion affect patterns of social interaction, which in turn are likely
to shape (and confirm) one's own transformational tendencies.
Indeed, initial beliefs regarding others' cooperative and noncoop-
erative behavior are likely to be confirmed through individuals'
own behavior (especially among those who approach others non-
cooperatively; cf. Kelley & Stahelski, 1970). Thus, on the basis
of interdependence theory, we assumed that social interaction
experiences, which are a function of the situation and the two
(or more) persons involved, are the basis for the development of
relatively stable social value orientations.
It is clear that different individuals experience different histor-
ies of social interaction. For example, young children who have
repeatedly experienced interactions in which parents are very
attentive to their elementary needs are likely to develop trust and
security, which may promote prosocial orientation. Conversely,
children who have repeatedly experienced interactions in which
parents are not very attentive to their needs are likely to develop
distrust and insecurity, which may enhance self-centered orien-
tations. As another example, relative to individuals raised in
small families, individuals raised in large families may have
acquired greater experience with situations entailing some con-
flict of interest (e.g., scarcity of material or immaterial re-
sources, such as the sharing of toys or attention from parents),
which produces patterns of social interaction that may in turn
shape individuals1 social value orientations. Thus, as a conse-
quence of such interaction experiences, individuals acquire inter-
personal dispositions, reflected in the probability of approaching
certain classes of interdependent situations in a prosocial, indi-
vidualistic, or competitive manner.1
Although social value orientations are relatively stable over
time, such transformational tendencies may be further shaped
by patterns of social interaction as one experiences throughout
a lifetime, from early adulthood to old age (cf. Erikson, 1980).
It is plausible that throughout a lifetime, individuals acquire
greater experience with a more varied set of social interactions
(e.g., greater experience with others depending on you, greater
experience with partners who differ in their approach to interde-
pendence situations). Such extended experience may shape the
further development of social value orientation.
Interaction Experiences and Social Value Orientations:
Empirical Evidence
Although interdependence theory emphasizes the role of so-
cial interaction experiences in shaping social value orientations,
1
 Interaction experiences need not always be direct, but may also
be vicarious (i.e., provided by social models; cf. Bandura, 1969) and
complemented by explicit teaching of rules and norms relevant to inter-
dependent behavior. Thus, we did not assume that social interaction
experiences are limited to one's own, direct experience. Moreover, we
did not assume that social interaction experiences are always carefully
evaluated, nor that the development of social value orientation occurs
in a calculated, systematic manner. We believe that, over extended experi-
ence with different social interactions, individuals develop habitual ten-
dencies to react to specific patterns of interdependence situations in
specific ways, such that the transformation process occurs quite rapidly,
with little or no conscious thought. (Of course, this is not to argue that
one never reevaluates habitual tendencies, even if one was to experience
similar interdependent situations and partners; indeed, one is likely to
do so when experiencing poor outcomes, when being reprimanded, or
when interdependent others tend to react in unforeseen ways.)
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this analysis does not deny that there may be genetic factors
or differences in our biological makeup that account for the
development of different social value orientations (for empirical
evidence, see Olweus, 1979; Rushton, Fulker, Neale, Nias, &
Eysenck, 1986). Rather, interdependence theory assumes that
above and beyond that with which we are born—above and
beyond the opportunities and limitations dictated by our biologi-
cal makeup—individuals develop preferences and adaptations
on the basis of experience with situations of interdependence
(cf. Rusbult & Van Lange, 1996). Is there evidence relevant to
this basic assumption? Are differences in social value orienta-
tion at least in part a function of social interaction experiences?
Some research has revealed that tendencies toward prosocial
behavior increase with age, even among very young children
(i.e., 2 to 4 years old; e.g., Durkin, 1995). However, also among
somewhat older children (i.e., up to young adolescence), there
is a gradual increase in prosocial behavior, including coopera-
tion and equality (e.g., Eisenberg & Fabes, 1991; Knight &
Dubro, 1984; Rushton, 1975). Moreover, there is research indi-
cating that the development of tendencies toward cooperative
and competitive behavior differs as a function of culture. A
consistent finding across a variety of studies is that children
raised in cultures characterized by high levels of collectivism,
interpersonal closeness, and interdependence tend to exhibit
greater cooperation and less competition than children raised in
cultures characterized by relatively low levels of collectivism,
interpersonal closeness, and interdependence (i.e., comparisons
of children raised in homogeneous, rural environments and those
raised in heterogeneous, urban environments; Knight, Kagan, &
Buriel, 1981; Knight, Kagan, Nelson, & Gumbiner, 1978; Mad-
sen & Lancy, 1981; McClintock, 1974). Although such findings
allow for several interpretations, they are congruent with the
general assumption that social interaction experiences shape
transformational tendencies.
Study 1
The purpose of Study 1 was to examine the relationship be-
tween social value orientation and attachment styles, a social
disposition that is very explicitly assumed to be a product of
past interaction experiences. Following traditional conceptual-
izations of attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980; see
also Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978), the field of
personality and social psychology has recently emphasized the
contribution of adult attachment styles in understanding patterns
of interaction in ongoing relationships (e.g., Collins & Read,
1990; Hazan & Shaver, 1987; Simpson, 1990). It is important
to note that attachment theory assumes that early childhood
experiences with the primary caregiver (usually the mother)
form the basis of the development of a particular attachment
style. Traditionally, three attachment styles have been delineated,
often called secure, anxious—ambivalent, and avoidant attach-
ment (cf. Ainsworth et al., 1978). Secure individuals tend to
find it easy to get close to others and do not tend to worry about
being abandoned or about someone getting too close to them.
Anxious—ambivalent individuals tend to seek closeness but feel
that others are reluctant to become as close as they would like.
Finally, avoidant individuals feel somewhat uncomfortable be-
ing close to others and tend to be somewhat distrustful of others.
Should the three differing social value orientations be associ-
ated with these three attachment styles? Recall that Bowlby
(1969, 1973, 1980) reasoned that the dimension of security
versus insecurity is most important in accounting for different
behaviors and responses of young children (e.g., probability of
crying when left alone), a claim supported by subsequent re-
search by Ainsworth et al. (1978). How can the dimension of
security versus insecurity be understood in terms of an interde-
pendence analysis? We suggest that the early development of
secure versus insecure attachment is at least partially a result
of early patterns of social interaction, which presumably are
importantly influenced by the primary caregiver. In particular,
given that a young child is highly dependent on the primary
caregiver, secure individuals have acquired greater experience
than insecure individuals with interactions in which elementary
needs and preferences are fulfilled by the primary caregiver.
Accordingly, secure individuals may have learned to perceive
interdependent situations and partners as safe and secure, readily
behaving in a trusting manner, thereby increasing the possibility
of developing cooperative patterns of interactions with interde-
pendent others. Such experiences are likely to enhance prosocial
orientation. In contrast, insecure individuals may have learned
to perceive interdependent situations and partners as dangerous
and risky, behaving in a rather distrusting manner, thereby run-
ning the risk of developing noncooperative patterns of interac-
tion with interdependent others. Such experiences are likely to
enhance individualistic—and perhaps competitive—orienta-
tion. Thus, we advanced the general hypothesis that prosocials
will exhibit greater levels of secure attachment than individual-
ists and competitors. We refer to this prediction as the prosocial-
security hypothesis.2
For more exploratory purposes, we were interested in examin-
ing the link between social value orientations and levels of
anxious-ambivalent attachment and levels of avoidant attach-
ment. Given that higher levels of these attachment styles indicate
a fair amount of insecurity, one could advance the prediction
that, relative to individualists and competitors, prosocials will
evidence lower levels of anxious-ambivalent attachment and
lower levels of avoidant attachment. However, levels of anxious-
ambivalent and avoidant attachment represent not only relatively
low levels of security, but also differential preferences for seek-
ing versus avoiding intimacy or interdependence (for further
discussion, see Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991; Shaver et al.
1996). Given that individualists and competitors are more likely
2
 The prosocial-security hypothesis may also be based on comparisons
of taxonomies of attachment styles and models of social value orienta-
tion. Recent taxonomies of attachment styles have conceptualized secu-
rity in terms of the degree to which an individual has developed a
positive model of both self and others; avoidance has been assumed to
represent a positive model of self but a negative model of others; and
anxious-ambivalent attachment has been assumed to represent a nega-
tive model of self but a positive model of others (e.g., Bartholomew &
Horowitz, 1991). Similarly, the concept of social value orientation has
been conceptualized in terms of self-other models, with prosocials as-
signing positive weights to the well-being of self and others, individual-
ists assigning positive weights to primarily the well-being of self, and
competitors assigning positive weight to the well-being of self and nega-
tive weight to the well-being of others (e.g., McClintock & Liebrand,
1988).
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than prosocials to avoid or withdraw from patterns of interde-
pendence (e.g., Orbell & Dawes, 1993), another (albeit indi-
rect ) variation of the prosocial-security hypothesis would be that
prosocials exhibit lower levels of avoidant attachment relative to
individualists and competitors. Given that prosocials might be
more secure, as well as more appreciative of interdependent
relationships than individualists and competitors, we advanced
no formal hypothesis regarding social value orientation differ-
ences for levels of anxious-ambivalent attachment. Finally, past
research has revealed no strong evidence indicating that men
and women differ in terms of adult attachment styles (e.g..
Shaver et al., 1996). In a highly exploratory vein, we examined
whether the hypothesized relationship between social value ori-
entation and level of secure attachment would be influenced by
gender.
Method
Participants and design, A total of 573 individuals (338 women,
228 men, 7 unidentified) participated in this research (mean age: 22.3
years). They were recruited at several locations at the campus of the Free
University, Amsterdam, including the university library and cafeteria. The
design was a 3 (social value orientation: prosocials vs. individualists
vs. competitors) x 2 (gender: women vs. men) factorial with measures
of secure, avoidant, and anxious-ambivalent attachment as the three
dependent variables.
Procedure. Differences in social value orientation were assessed by
using a series of decomposed games (Messick & McClintock, 1968),
which involve making choices among combinations of outcomes for
oneself and for another person. In the current study, we used a nine-
item decomposed game measure of social value orientation, an efficient
and easy-to-administer instrument that was adopted from prior research
(e.g., Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994; Van Lange et al., in press). The
Appendix presents this decomposed game measure. As can be seen in
this Appendix, the other was said to be someone whom participants did
not know and whom they would never knowingly meet in the future.
This allowed us to examine participants' general tendencies toward oth-
ers. Also, the instructions noted that the other would also make choices;
this allowed us to frame the choice situations as ones involving some
interdependence between the participant and the other. Finally, outcomes
were presented in terms of points, and participants were asked to imagine
that the points had value to themselves as well as to the other person.
Similar instructions have been used in past research (see Kuhlman &
Marshello, 1975; McClintock & Allison, 1989; for other decomposed
game measures, see Knight & Dubro, 1984; Liebrand, Jansen, Rijken, &
Suhre, 1986). These measures of social value orientation have generally
revealed good internal consistency and test-retest reliability over a pe-
riod ranging from 2 months to 6 months (e.g., Kuhlman, Camac, &
Cunha, 1986; Van Lange & Semin-Goossens, 1997).
As can been seen in the Appendix, an example of a decomposed game
is the choice among three options: Option A, 480 points for self and 80
points for other; Option B, 540 points for self and 280 points for other;
and Option C, 480 points for self and 480 points for other. In this
example, Option A represents the competitive choice, because it provides
a larger difference between one's own and the other's outcomes (480
- 80 = 400) than does either Option B (540 - 280 = 260) or Option
C (480 - 480 = 0) . Option B represents the individualistic choice,
because one's own outcomes are larger (540) than are those in Option
A (480) or Option C (480). Finally, Option C represents the prosocial
choice, because it provides a larger joint outcome (480 + 480 = 960)
than does either Option A (480 + 80 = 560) or Option B (540 + 280
= 820); also, Option C represents a smaller discrepancy between one's
own and other's outcomes (480 - 480 = 0) than does either Option A
(480 - 80 - 400) or Option B (540 - 280 = 260).
Participants were classified as either prosocial, individualistic, or com-
petitive if at least six choices were consistent with one of these social
value orientations. Following these criteria, we identified 248 partici-
pants as prosocial, 164 as individualistic, and 46 as competitive; 115
participants (20%) could not be classified. Social value orientation ex-
hibited a marginal relationship with gender, x2 (2, N = 453) = 5.27, p
< .10, with prosocials being somewhat more prevalent among women
(58.5%) than among men (47.7%) and individualists being somewhat
less prevalent among women (32.2%) than among men (41.0%); the
percentages of competitors were about equal among women (9.3%) and
men (11.3%).
Measurement of adult attachment styles. Measurement of levels of
secure, avoidant, and anxious-ambivalent attachment was based on a
13-item measure adapted from Hazan and Shaver (1987) and validated
by Camelley and Janoff-Bulman (1992). However, given that the pur-
pose of Study 1 was to assess general attachment styles (i.e., attachment
relevant to one's interpersonal dealings with others in general, not with
one's close relationship partner per se), we excluded items that involved
attachment to the current partner (e.g., "I worry that a love partner
might not really love me") . Therefore, five items were used to assess
level of secure attachment (e.g., "I find it easy to trust others," "I find
it easy to get close to others", and "I feel comfortable having other
people depend on me' ' ) ; level of avoidant attachment was measured by
using three items (e.g., "I am nervous when anyone gets too close");
finally, level of anxious-ambivalent attachment was assessed by using
three items (e.g., "I find that other people don't want to get as close
as I would like"). The internal consistency of the latter two scales was
acceptable (level of avoidant attachment, 3 items, a = .66; level of
anxious-ambivalent attachment, 3 items, a = .67).
The internal consistency of the five items measuring level of secure
attachment was judged to be unacceptable (a = .46); however, after
discarding two items the resultant internal consistency was judged to be
acceptable (a = .57). Therefore, in our analyses we examined the
average scores of the three-item scales measuring level of secure, avoid-
ant, and anxious-ambivalent attachment. The current scales parallel
levels of internal consistency observed in the United States (a = .62,
.59, and .68, respectively, for secure, avoidant, and anxious-ambivalent
attachment; Carnelley & Janoff-Bulman, 1992). The data of three partic-
ipants were discarded because of missing values.
Results and Discussion
We conducted a 3 (social value orientation: prosocials vs.
individualists vs. competitors) X 2 (gender: women vs. men)
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with the three-
item measures of secure, anxious-ambivalent, and avoidant at-
tachment styles as dependent measures. This analysis revealed
a multivariate main effect for social value orientation, F(6, 886)
— 3.05, p < .01. At the univariate level, the main effect for
social value orientation was significant for level of secure attach-
ment, F(2, 444) = 7.07, p < .001, and marginal for both level
of avoidant attachment, F(2, 444) = 2.47, p < .10, and level
of anxious-ambivalent attachment, F(2, 444) = 2.76, p < .10.
The two-factor MANOVA did not reveal any effects involving
gender, indicating that the association of social value orientation
and secure attachment is independent of participant's gender.
Consistent with the prosocial-security hypothesis, prosocials
(M - 6.24, SD = 1.38) exhibited greater levels of secure attach-
ment than did individualists (M — 5.92, SD = 1.35) or competi-
tors (M = 5.51, SD = 1.59). Subsequent planned comparisons
revealed a significant contrast between prosocials versus individ-
ualists and competitors, F(1, 444) = 11.09, p < .001, and a
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marginal difference between individualists and competitors,
F ( l , 444) = 3.04, p < .10. These findings are presented in
Figure 1.
Second, congruent with the prosocial-security hypothesis,
contrasts relevant to the marginal relationship between social
value orientation and avoidant attachment revealed that proso-
cials (M = 3.56, SD = 1.61) exhibited lower levels of avoidant
attachment than did individualists (M = 3.92, SD = 1.48) and
competitors (M = 3.86, SD = 1.48), respectively, /"(I , 444)
= 4,88, p < .05. The contrast between individualists and com-
petitors was not significant. Finally, relevant to the marginal
relationship between social value orientation and levels of anx-
ious-ambivalent attachment, subsequent comparisons revealed
a significant contrast of prosocials (M — 4.93, SD = 1.60)
versus individualists (M = 4.63, SD = 1.71) and competitors
(M = 4.55, SD = 1.80), respectively, F( 1, 444) = 4.63, p <
.05. The contrast between individualists and competitors was
not significant.
Study 2
Study 1 provided good support for the prosocial-security hy-
pothesis, in that prosocials described their feelings and experi-
ences relevant to others in general to be more secure (and some-
what less avoidant) than did individualists and competitors.
Study 2 was designed to examine the association between social
value orientation and partner-specific forms of secure attach-
ment, focusing on feelings and experiences of secure attachment
relevant to the current partner with whom participants were
intimately involved.
Method
Participants and design. A total of 136 Dutch individuals (63
women, 73 men) participated in this research (mean age: 23.8 years).
They were recruited at several locations at the campus of the Free
University, Amsterdam, including the university library and cafeteria. All
individuals were involved in a relationship of at least 3 months in dura-
tion (mean relationship duration: 31 months). The design was a 3 (social
value orientation) X 2 (gender) factorial, with measures of secure,
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Figure 1. Mean levels of attachment security among prosocials, indi-
vidualists, and competitors (Study I) .
avoidant, and anxious-ambivalent attachment as the three dependent
variables.
Procedure. The survey included an instrument measuring individu-
als' social value orientation and an instrument measuring levels of se-
cure, avoidant, and anxious-ambivalent attachment. Social value orien-
tations were measured as in Study 1 (see Appendix). Following the
same criteria as in Study 1 (i.e., making at least six consistent choices),
we identified 66 prosocials, 35 individualists, and 19 competitors (16
participants made fewer than six consistent choices and therefore could
not be classified in one of the above groups). Unlike Study 1, there was
no evidence of an association between social value orientation and gen-
der, x 2 (2 . N = 120) = 2.14, ns.
In measuring levels of secure, avoidant, and anxious-ambivalent at-
tachment, we used descriptions adapted from Hazan and Shaver's (1987)
three-prototype descriptions of how people typically feel in relation-
ships. In light of the present purposes, there were three notable differ-
ences between Hazan and Shaver's measure and the present measure.
First, whereas the descriptions used by Hazan and Shaver focus on
feelings and experiences relevant to others in general, the current descrip-
tions were reworded so as to measure feelings and experiences relevant
to the participant's current partner. Second, rather than using phrases
such as "getting close" or "being close," we used phrases such as
"sharing intimate feelings and experiences." The reasons for this were
that (a) the term "closeness" does not translate perfectly into Dutch
and (b) we wanted to focus on fairly concrete experiences and feelings.
Finally, whereas Hazan and Shaver asked participants to endorse the
description that best described their feelings and experiences, we asked
participants to rate each of these descriptions in terms of how well they
described themselves (1 = describes me not at all, 4 = describes me
somewhat, 7 = describes me very well; for similar procedures, see
Shaver & Brennan, 1992).
Translated from Dutch, the respective descriptions measuring levels
of secure, avoidant, and anxious-ambivalent attachment read as follows:
I find it relatively easy to share intimate feelings and experiences
with my partner and am comfortable to be dependent on one another.
I don't often worry that my partner abandons me, or that my partner
wants to share loo intimate feelings and experiences, (secure
attachment)
I am somewhat uncomfortable when my partner and I share very
intimate feelings and experiences. I find it difficult to trust my
partner completely, difficult to allow myself to depend on him/her.
I am nervous when we share very intimate feelings and experiences,
and often my partner wants me to be more intimate than I feel
comfortable being, (avoidant attachment)
I wish that my partner would share more intimate feelings and
experiences with me. I often worry that my partner doesn't really
love me or won't want to stay with me. I want to merge completely
with my partner, and this desire sometimes scares my partner, (anx-
ious-ambivalent attachment)
Finally, given that individuals may be inclined to present themselves
(or indirectly, their romantic partner or relationship) in a desirable man-
ner, we included an instrument measuring tendencies toward social desir-
ability {12 true-false items adapted from Crowne & Marlowe, 1964).
As in some other research (e.g.. Van Lange et al., 1997), the internal
consistency (a — .49) was clearly lower than ideal, yet we judged it to
be acceptable in light of the fact that this scale focuses on several
different tendencies and behaviors in a variety of situations (e.g., tenden-
cies to gossip, tendencies to carefully read political programs prior to
voting) and because this instrument has been widely used in prior
research.
It appeared that only one of the constructs assessed in the present
research was significantly linked to social desirability. There was a
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significant link between level of anxious-ambivalent attachment and
social desirability, r( 115) = .26,p < .01, suggesting that the expression
of the desire for closeness, yet worrying that others do not wish to
become equally close, is to some degree desirable. Such links with levels
of secure attachment, r( 115) = - .17 , and levels of avoidant attachment,
r(115) = .07, were not significant. Moreover, social value orientation
was not significantly linked to social desirability, F(2, 115) = 2.53,
suggesting that the measurement of prosocial, individualistic, and com-
petitive orientations by means of decomposed games is relatively free
of tendencies toward presenting oneself in a socially desirable manner. In
the analyses reported below, the data of two participants were discarded
because of missing values.
Results and Discussion
We conducted a 3 (social value orientation) X 2 (gender)
MANOVA, with the measures of secure, anxious-ambivalent,
and avoidant attachment styles as dependent measures. This
analysis revealed a significant multivariate main effect for social
value orientation, F(6, 222) = 3.27, p < .005. At the univariate
level, the main effect for social value orientation was found to
be significant for level of secure attachment, F(2, 112) = 5.53,
p < .005, and nonsignificant for both level of avoidant attach-
ment, F(2, 112) = 2.54, and level of anxious-ambivalent at-
tachment, F(2, 112) = .12. The two-factor MANOVA did not
reveal any effects involving gender, indicating that the associa-
tion of social value orientation and secure attachment is indepen-
dent of participant's gender.
As can be seen in Figure 2, prosocials (M = 5.25, SD =
1.90) exhibited greater levels of secure attachment than did
individualists (M = 4.91, SD = 1.76) or competitors (M = 3.68,
SD - 2.14). Consistent with the prosocial-security hypothesis,
planned comparisons revealed significant contrasts between pro-
socials versus individualists and competitors, F( 1, 112) = 4.94,
p < .05, and between individualists and competitors, F( 1, 112)
= 6.11,/> < .05.
Study 3
Studies 1 and 2 were designed to provide evidence in support
of the link between social value orientation and levels of secure
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Figure 2. Mean levels of attachment security among prosocials, indi-
vidualists, and competitors (Study 2).
attachment, which was explicitly assumed to be developed by
early childhood experiences with the primary caregiver. Of
course, demonstrating a simple link between social value orien-
tation and level of secure attachment provides very indirect
evidence in support of the more general claim that differences in
social value orientation are at least partially rooted in childhood
experiences of social interaction. Two limitations, in particular,
are worth discussing. First, differences in level of secure attach-
ment are assumed to be a function of interactions between care-
giver and child. However, development of social value orienta-
tions may also be rooted in patterns of interaction with peers
during young childhood and early adolescence. Second, demon-
strating a link between secure attachment and social value orien-
tation fails to provide direct insight into more "objective" fea-
tures that may underlie differences in social interaction as expe-
rienced during childhood and early adolescence.
Study 3 addressed these limitations by examining the associa-
tion between social value orientation and number of siblings.
How might different transformational tendencies develop in the
context of few versus many other siblings? We propose that the
number of siblings has a substantial influence on interaction
experiences, particularly during childhood. Number of siblings
should be linked to the frequency—and possibly the intensity—
with which one is confronted with situations characterized by
intermediate or low correspondence of outcomes. The greater
the number of siblings, the more likely is it that individuals will
face situations in which particular resources have to be shared,
resources that provide the basis for outcomes, material outcomes
(e.g., toys, space) as well as psychological outcomes (e.g., at-
tention from parents; cf. Hoffman, 1991). How might such
interdependence features affect social interactions? How might
number of siblings shape social value orientation?
Given repeated experience with situations of intermediate or
low correspondence, individuals may adapt in such a manner as
to approach these situations in a cooperative and coordinating
manner, thereby gradually learning the functional value of acting
in a collectively beneficial manner. This reasoning suggests that
individuals that are part of larger families are more likely to
develop prosocial orientation. Indeed, the well-established find-
ing that children raised in cultures characterized by high levels
of collectivism and interdependence tend to exhibit greater coop-
eration than children raised in cultures characterized by rela-
tively low levels of collectivism and interdependence is consis-
tent with this argument, in that the former children typically
have been raised in larger families than the latter children (e.g.,
children raised in rural parts of Mexico vs. children raised in
the United States; Madsen & Shapira, 1977). Thus, this reason-
ing leads one to expect that prosocials will have a greater num-
ber of siblings than will individualists and competitors (i.e.,
sibling-prosocial hypothesis).
An alternative line of reasoning suggests that repeated experi-
ence with situations of intermediate or low correspondence,
especially in the context of larger groups, gives rise to noncoop-
erative interaction experiences. For example, prior research on
social dilemmas has demonstrated that cooperative interactions
decline as groups arc somewhat larger in size (e.g., in compari-
sons of groups of 2, 3, and up to 7 persons; Bonacich, Shure,
Kahan, & Meeker, 1976; Hamburger, Guyer, & Fox, 1975). If
this is true, such noncooperative interaction experiences should
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give rise to somewhat lower levels of trust and increased pessi-
mism regarding individuals' willingness and ability to act in a
collectively beneficial manner, thereby instigating the develop-
ment of proself (i.e., individualistic and competitive) orienta-
tion. Thus, this reasoning leads one to expect that prosocials
will have a smaller number of siblings than will individualists
and competitors (i.e., sibling-proself hypothesis).
Relevant to the two hypotheses noted above, we examined
the relationship between social value orientation and birth order.
Later barns obviously grow up with a sizable number of siblings,
whereas early borns will only later experience the influence of
more siblings. From this perspective, we can advance two spe-
cific predictions. According to the sibling-prosocial hypothesis,
prosocials should have a greater number of older siblings than
individualists and competitors. Conversely, according to the sib-
ling-proself hypothesis, prosocials should have a smaller number
of older siblings than individualists and competitors.
Finally, in a highly exploratory vein, we examined the rela-
tionship between social value orientation and the sex ratio of
siblings. Prior research has revealed a link (albeit weak) be-
tween social value orientation and gender, such that among
women prosocials tend to be a bit more prevalent than among
men. Indeed, Study 1 revealed a marginal link between these
variables. Hence, it is possible that the development of prosocial
orientation increases with the presence of female siblings rather
than male siblings. However, given the speculative nature of
such reasoning and the fact that more complex lines of reasoning
are possible (e.g., arguments suggesting specific patterns of
interactions between one's own gender and the sex-ratio of sib-
lings), we advanced no formal prediction for the link between
social value orientation and the sex-ratio of siblings.
Method
Participants and design. A total of 631 Dutch individuals (335
women, 29S men, 1 unidentified; mean age: 24.0 years) participated in
several survey and laboratory studies that included questions relevant
to number of siblings, birth order, and sex ratio of siblings. In some
studies, participants were recruited at specific locations at the Free Uni-
versity, Amsterdam (e.g., library, cafeteria), whereas in other studies
participants were recruited by means of an advertisement in the univer-
sity paper.
Procedure. In all studies, social value orientation was assessed as
in Studies I and 2. Following the same criteria as in Studies 1 and 2
(i.e., making at least six consistent choices), we identified 311 prosocials
(57%), 160 individualists (30%), and 73 competitors (13%), a distribu-
tion similar to those found in prior research (87 participants made fewer
than six consistent choices and therefore could not be classified in one of
the above groups.) Unlike Study 1, there was no evidence of a significant
association between social value orientation and gender, x2(2, N = 544)
= .84, ns. The questionnaire asked participants to list the total number
of siblings older than themselves, the total number of siblings younger
than themselves, as well as the total number of brothers and the total
number of sisters. The data of three participants were discarded because
of missing values.
Results and Discussion
The association between social value orientation and number
of siblings was analyzed by using a 3 (social value orientation:
prosocials vs. individualists vs. competitors) x 2 (gender:
women vs. men) analysis of variance (ANCAft.). Of course,
this analysis did not assume that social value orientation causes
variations in the so-called dependent measures—indeed, the
reverse order of causation is more plausible. We used the
ANOVA framework because the dependent measure complied
with a ratio level of measurement (i.e., the same holds for the
other dependent measures, including number of siblings older
than the participant, the number of siblings younger than the
participant, the number of brothers, and the number of sisters).
This analysis revealed a significant main effect for social value
orientation, F(2, 535) = 4.82, p < .01. Consistent with the
sibling-prosocial hypothesis, Panel A of Figure 3 reveals that
the number of siblings is greater for prosocials (A/ = 2.03, SD
= 1.56) than for individualists (M = 1.63, SD = 1.00) and
competitors (M = 1.71, SD — 1.35). Subsequent planned com-
A 2.5
Prosocials Individualists Competitors
Social Value Orientation
B 1.5
Prosocials Individualists Competitors
Social Value Orientation
C 1.5-,
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Figure 3. Mean number of siblings (Panel A), older siblings (Panel
B) , and sisters (Panel C) among prosocials, individualists, and
competitors.
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parisons revealed a significant contrast between prosocials ver-
sus individualists and competitors, F{\, 535) = 9.14,/J < .005.
Differences between individualists and competitors were not
significant. The 3 x 2 ANOV\ did not reveal any other signifi-
cant effects (i.e., main or interaction effects involving gender).
Next, we conducted a 3 (social value orientation) X 2 (gen-
der) MANOVA on the number of older siblings, the number of
younger siblings, the number of brothers, and the number of
sisters.3 This analysis revealed a multivariate main effect for
social value orientation, F(8, 1066) = 1.99, p < .05. At the
univariate level, we found a significant main effect for social
value orientation for number of older siblings, F(2, 535) =
3.64, p < .05, and number of sisters, F(2, 535) = 6.16, p <
.005. First, Panel B of Figure 3 reveals that the number of older
siblings was greater for prosocials (M ~ 0.96, SD = 1.25)
than for individualists (M = 0.67, SD = 0.79). Subsequent
comparisons revealed a significant contrast between prosocials
versus individualists and competitors, F{\, 535) = 4.94, p <
.05. Differences between individualists and competitors (M =
0.90, SD = 1.02) were not significant. Second, Panel C of Figure
3 reveals that the number of sisters was greater for prosocials (M
= 1.05, SD = 1.14) than for individualists (M = 0.74, SD
= 0.75) or competitors (M = 0.76, SD = 0.88). Subsequent
comparisons revealed a significant contrast between prosocials
versus individualists and competitors, F( 1, 535) = 12.27, p <
.001. Differences between individualists and competitors were
not significant. The 3 X 2 ANOVAs did not reveal any other
significant effects (i.e., main or interaction effects involving
gender). Although several specific explanations may account
for these findings, they are congruent with the more general
assumption that differences in social value orientation are par-
tially rooted in different patterns of social interaction as experi-
enced, at least in part, during the periods spanning early child-
hood to young adulthood.
Study 4
Study 4 was designed to provide evidence relevant to the
claim that social value orientations are further shaped by differ-
ent patterns of social interaction as experienced during early
adulthood, middle adulthood, and old age. Our primary purpose
was to examine the possible relationship between the distribu-
tion of three types of social value orientations (i.e., prosocials,
individualists, and competitors) and age differences among a
sample of adults in the Netherlands. There are several lines of
reasoning why a relationship between these variables is plausi-
ble, advancing either (a) the hypothesis that the percentage of
prosocials increases with age, whereas the percentage of individ-
ualists and competitors decreases with age (i.e., prosocial-
growth hypothesis) or (b) the hypothesis that the percentage
of prosocials decreases with age, whereas the percentage of
individualists and competitors increases with age (i.e., proself-
growth hypothesis).
What logic would underlie the prosocial-growth hypothesis?
We suggest three complementary lines of reasoning. First, one
may assume that all three social value orientations have func-
tional value, depending on certain features of interdependence
and behavior of interaction partners. At the same time, there
is good reason to believe that across differing interdependent
situations and interaction partners a prosocial orientation is more
functional than an individualistic or competitive orientation. In-
dividuals with a prosocial orientation tend to behave in a tit-
for-tat manner, approaching others cooperatively and turning to
noncooperation if others fail to cooperate. Such strategies tend
to enhance both long-term personal well-being and collective
well-being and have been asserted to be functional from an
evolutionary perspective (cf. Axelrod, 1984; Trivers, 1971 ).4 It
is possible that over a lifetime, individuals increasingly detect
the functional aspects of a prosocial orientation, thus becoming
more prosocial and less individualistic or competitive over time.
Second, one might assume that the nature of interdependence
situations changes over the course of a lifetime (cf. Levinson,
1986). For example, young adults may especially confront situa-
tions with rather low levels of correspondence, in that they
typically have to compete for scarce resources (e.g., competing
for jobs, partners). Later, when facing middle adulthood, indi-
viduals tend to establish themselves (e.g., in terms of careers
and family) and increasingly face interaction situations in which
others depend on their help and service (e.g., children, junior
colleagues). Then, when facing old age, individuals tend to
become somewhat more dependent on others tor the provision
of good outcomes (e.g., need for help because of some restraints
following from old age). Because the interdependence features
that are characteristic of later life phases call for tendencies
toward helping others (and to some degree, being helped), it is
likely that prosocial orientation increases as a function of age.
Moreover, this second account complements the first explana-
tion, in that a more varied set of interaction experiences may
further help individuals to detect the functional aspects of proso-
cial orientation.
Third, over the course of this century, many societies, includ-
ing the Netherlands, have become less collectivistic, yielding
lower levels of interpersonal closeness and interdependence (i.e.,
a movement from rural, interpersonally close cultures to urban-
ized, interpersonally distant environments). Accordingly, the
probability of being raised in collectivistic subcultures decreases
with age. Given the association between levels of collectivism
and prosocial orientation, one might speculate that, if the pri-
mary orientations are developed during early childhood, proso-
cial orientation should increase with age.
What logic would underlie the proself-growth hypothesis?
One might assume that individuals assign greater weight and
attention to patterns of interaction that are harmful to their own
well-being than to patterns that are helpful to their own well-
being (cf. Fiske, 1980; Skowronski & Carlston, 1989). Given
that the cumulative experience with incidents of harm in settings
of interdependence increases with age, one might argue that
levels of trust in the prosocial motivation of others tend to gradu-
ally decline with age. Such decline in trust may be associated
with a decline in prosocial orientation and an increase in individ-
i
 We did not conduct a MANOVA for all five dependent measures
because, logically, number of siblings is statistically related to the other
four measures of siblings.
4
 Although few would doubt the functionality of tit for tat, it is not
necessarily true that tit for tat would logically outperform all other
possible interaction strategies (e.g., Selten & Hammerstein, 1984).
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ualistic or competitive orientations (cf. Kuhlman et al., 1986;
Pruitt& Kimmel, 1977).
Of lesser relevance, Study 4 enabled us to examine two addi-
tional questions. First, the present research used a large sample
of participants that was representative of the Dutch adult popula-
tion. This allowed us to compare the distribution of social value
orientations obtained in this study with distributions observed
in prior research that has used samples of primarily college
students (these samples are sometimes referred to as conve-
nience samples). Indeed, it is fair to conclude that researchers'
knowledge about social value orientation, issues of cooperation
and competition, and related topics is primarily based on data
from college students, thus providing a somewhat restricted
database for researchers' knowledge and theoretical develop-
ment (cf. Sears, 1986). Therefore, we explored whether (and
if so, how) the prevalence of prosocials, individualists, and com-
petitors in these convenience samples is different from that of
the adult population in the real world.
Second, Study 4 examined the relationship between social
value orientation and gender. Prior research has revealed some
evidence that women are more likely than men to exhibit cooper-
ative choice behavior, although such findings have been incon-
sistently observed (for a review, see Komorita & Parks, 1994;
Van Lange, Liebrand, Messick, & Wilke, 1992). Moreover, sev-
eral studies have examined a link between social value orienta-
tion and gender, finding weak evidence that women are more
likely to be classified as prosocial and less likely to be classified
as individualistic or competitive (e.g., McClintock & Liebrand,
1988; Van Lange, 1992). However, the (relatively small) sam-
ples in these studies consisted of primarily college students.
By using a large sample that was representative of the adult
population, the present research examined whether the preva-
lence of prosocials is greater (and that of individualists and
competitors smaller) among women than among men. Also, in
an exploratory vein, we examined the association between social
value orientation and level of education.
Method
Participants and design. A total of 1,728 individuals participated
in this research. This sample comprised individuals who had agreed
to participate once every week in surveys and research conducted by
Telepanel, an organization linked to the University of Amsterdam. In
exchange, each participant received a personal computer that was also
used for surveys and research. This personal computer was connected
with the main computer at Telepanel where the data were stored automat-
ically. The Telepanel organization has made every attempt possible to
recruit a sample of participants that is representative of the Dutch adult
population. In the present sample, there were 940 (54.4%) men and 788
(45.6%) women; mean age was 45.7 years (age ranged from 15 years
through 89 years). Slightly less than half of the participants had a
(paid) job (48%), some were homemakers (20.1%), some were retired
(14.3%), some were students (7.2%), a few were not able to work
(3%), a few were unemployed (2.8%), and the remainder were involved
in volunteer work or reported to be doing "something else" (4.6%).
By using this sample, we examined the association between social value
orientation (prosocials vs. individualists vs. competitors), age (15-29
years vs. 30-44 years vs. 45-59 years vs. 60 years and older), education
(university or higher education vs. intermediate education vs. lower
education), and gender (men vs. women).
Procedure. This study was part of a large survey that contained
some questionnaires and a set of biographical questions to assess age,
gender, and level of education. We included a series of six decomposed
games (decomposed games 1 through 6; see Appendix) to assess partici-
pants' social value orientations. Paralleling the criteria used in prior
research (i.e., at least 6 of 9 choices should be consistent with one of
three social value orientations), participants were classified if they made
at least five of six choices consistent with one of the three social value
orientations. It appeared that 135 participants (7.8%) made fewer than
five consistent choices and thus were not classified. From the remaining
1,593 participants, 1,134 (71.2%) were classified as prosocial, 340
(21.3%) were classified as individualistic, and 119 (7.5%) were classi-
fied as competitive.
Results and Discussion
Association between social value orientation, age, education,
and gender. The theoretical basis for classifying individuals
into distinct age categories was the work of Erikson and col-
leagues (Erikson, 1980; Erikson, Erikson, & Kivnick, 1986),
which distinguished among early adulthood (i.e., 20-35 years
old), middle adulthood (35-65 years old), and old age (i.e.,
at least 65 years old). However, we also wanted groups that (a)
were not extremely unequal in size and (b) represented equal
intervals. We therefore differentiated among four groups varying
in age, individuals who were (a) older than 15 years but younger
than 30 years (n - 270); (b) at least 30 and younger than 45
years (n = 523); (c) at least 45 and younger than 60 years (n
- 529); and (d) 60 years or older (n = 271).
Levels of education were varied in three groups as follows:
those who had completed or were currently pursuing university
or higher education (n = 336), those who had completed or
were currently enrolled in intermediate levels of education (n
= 382), and those who had completed lower levels of education
or who had not completed any form of education (n = 875).
The sample consisted of 868 men and 725 women.
The association of age, level of education, and gender with
social value orientation was analyzed in a 3 (social value orien-
tation) X 4 (age) X 3 (education) x 2 (gender) log-linear
analysis. We used a so-called hiloglinear analysis because our
analysis included four variables (allowing for 3 x 4 x 3 x 2
= 72 cells) and because the variables were skewed in their
distribution (cf. Knoke & Burke, 1980; Reynolds, 1977). This
analysis revealed significant main effects for social value orien-
tation, partial x2 (2, N = 1593) = 1061.72; age, partial x2 (3,
N = 1593) = 166.88; education, partial x2 (X N = 1593) -
314.90; and gender, partial
 X
2
 (1. N = 1593) = 12.85, (all ps
< .001), indicating that none of these distributions were equal.
More important, and relevant to the primary hypotheses (i.e.,
the prosocial-growth hypothesis and the proself-growth hypoth-
esis), the analysis revealed a Social Value Orientation x Age
interaction, partial x2 ( 6 , # = 1593) = 62.25,/? < .001. As can
be seen in Figure 4, the percentages of prosocials systematically
elevated with increasing age (varying from 55.9% to 67.3%,
77.5%, and 81.5%), whereas the percentages of individualists
(varying from 30.7% to 24.9%, 16.3%. and 15.1%) and compet-
itors (varying from 13.3% to 7.8%, 6.2%, and 3.3%) decreased
with increasing age. These findings are consistent with the pro-
social-growth hypothesis and inconsistent with the proself-
growth hypothesis.
Second, the analysis revealed a Social Value Orientation X
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Figure 4. The prevalence of social value orientations (in percentages)
among groups differing in age.
Gender interaction, partial x 2 (2. N = 1593) = 15.61, p <
.001. As predicted, the percentage of prosocials was higher
among women (75.6%) than among men (67.5%), whereas the
percentage of individualists was lower among women (18.1%)
than among men (24.1%). The groups did not differ in terms
of the percentage of competitors (6.3% and 8.4% for women
and men, respectively). Third, we did not find a relationship
between level of education and social value orientation; the
Social Value Orientation X Education interaction was not sig-
nificant, partial * 2 (4, N = 1593) = 7.46.5
Comparison of distributions of social value orientations
across studies. Another purpose of this study was to compare
the distribution of social value orientations observed in a sample
that was fairly representative of the Dutch adult population with
the social value orientations observed in student populations, a
common sample in research on social value orientations. We
used data from two prior studies that have used identical instruc-
tions, except that these two data sets were based on nine decom-
posed games rather than six decomposed games as in the current
work. The two prior studies involved sizable samples of primar-
ily students living either in the United States or the Netherlands
(Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994, N = 349; Van Lange et al., in
press, TV = 336). However, because the distributions of social
value orientations were almost identical in the two countries we
do not further discuss the role of nation.
Table 1 presents the distributions observed in Van Lange and
Kuhlman (1994), Van Lange et al. (in press), and the present
study, broken down for different groups of individuals on the
basis of age. As can be seen in Table 1, the distributions obtained
in Van Lange and Kuhlman (1994) and Van Lange et al. (in
press) were quite similar yet substantially different from the
total, present distribution. In the present distribution, there was
a greater percentage of prosocials and a lower percentage of
individualists and competitors, x2 (4, N = 2278) = 28.88, p <
.001. Next, we compared the distributions of the two prior stud-
ies with the present one, focusing on the group of individuals
who were older than 15 yet younger than 30—a group that is
comparable in age to the participants in the two prior studies.
The distributions were not significantly different, ^ 2 (4 , N =
955) = 2.97, ns, indicating that the percentages of prosocials,
individualists, and competitors were indeed very similar in the
three groups. We then compared the distributions of prior work
with those of the present participants who were between 30 and
45 years of age, 45 and 60 years of age, and 60 years and older.
Each comparison revealed significantly different distributions,
X
2(4,N= 1208) = 10.51,p < .05;x2(4,jV= 1214) = 39.77,
p < .001; and x 2(4, N = 956) = 41.43, p < .001, respectively.
Thus, these findings indicate that the distributions of social value
orientations were very similar to that obtained for a sample
representative of the Dutch adult population insofar as this sam-
ple consists of individuals of similar ages (i.e., between 15 and
30 years old).
General Discussion
The present research provides preliminary evidence in sup-
port of the claim that differences in social value orientation are
(a) partially rooted in different patterns of social interaction as
experienced during the period from early childhood to young
adulthood and (b) further shaped by different patterns of social
interaction as experienced during early adulthood, middle adult-
hood, and old age. Consistent with the prosocial-security hy-
pothesis, Studies 1 and 2 revealed that prosocials exhibit greater
levels of secure attachment than do individualists and competi-
tors. This finding is congruent with the contention that social
value orientation is partially rooted in experiences of interaction
between the individual and the primary caregiver. Indeed, we
are not aware of any personality construct that is linked so
directly (theoretically and empirically) to personal histories of
social interaction (cf. Ainsworth et al., 1978; Bowlby, 1969,
1973, 1980; Hazan & Shaver, 1987).
It is interesting that past research has revealed that high levels
of attachment security are associated with experiences of favor-
able life outcomes (i.e., healthy relationships with intimate part-
ners, parents, coworkers) as well as with the relative absence
of psychosomatic symptoms (for a review, see Shaver & Hazan,
1993). Demonstrating a link between level of secure attachment
and social value orientation is also important because it may
help researchers understand why the level of secure attachment
is related to the favorable life outcomes noted above. Granted,
it is plausible that interpersonal attitudes and feelings of security
(i.e., mental models; Hazan & Shaver, 1987) are an important
ingredient toward maintaining healthy relationships. However,
it is unlikely that such mental models operate in a vacuum,
independent of an individual's own behavior in interdependent
relationships. The present evidence in support of the prosocial-
5
 We observed three interaction effects that did not include social
value orientation. First, an Age X Education interaction, partial x2 (6.
N = 1593) = 64.73, p < .001, revealed that individuals with higher
education were more prominent in the more mature groups. Second, an
Education X Gender interaction, partial x2 (2> N = 1593) = 21.63, p
< .001, revealed that men were relatively more prominent among indi-
viduals who had completed high levels of education. Third, an Age x
Gender interaction, partial x2 (3, N = 1593) = 9.54, p < .05, revealed
lower percentages of women with increasing age.
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Table 1
Percentages of Prosocials, Individualists, and Competitors for Differing Age Groups (Study
4) and Differing Studies (Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994; Van Lange et al, in press)
Social value
orientation
Prosocials
Individualists
Competitors
Groups differing
15-29
55.9
30.7
13.3
30-44
67.3
24.9
7.8
in age (Study 4)
45-60
77.5
16.3
6.2
60+
81.5
15.1
3.3
Van Lange &
Kuhlman (1994)
60.8
27.2
12.0
Van Lange
et al. (in press)
60.5
25.2
14.3
security hypothesis suggests that the link between level of secure
attachment and favorable life outcomes is to some extent medi-
ated by one's own behavior in interdependent relationships.
That is, favorable life outcomes may also be promoted by the
inclination to approach interdependent others in a prosocial
manner, behaving in ways that serve both one's own well-being
and the others' well-being. Of course, this line of reasoning is
speculative and remains to be tested in future research.
A second major rinding was that prosocials reported having
more siblings than did individualists and competitors. This find-
ing, which supports the sibling-prosocial hypothesis, is congru-
ent with the notion that patterns of social interaction—as deter-
mined by number of siblings—shape the development of social
value orientation. This observation is also consistent with the
well-established finding that prosocial patterns of behavior are
more prevalent among individuals raised in cultures character-
ized by high (rather than low) levels of collectivism, interper-
sonal closeness, interdependence, and large (rather than small)
family size. The present research suggests that, in fact, family
size alone may partially account for this finding.6
Why did we find support for the sibling-prosocial hypothesis
(and why did we not find support for the sibling-proself hypothe-
sis)? As noted earlier, it is plausible that a greater number of
siblings is associated with a greater frequency—and possibly
intensity—with which one is confronted with conflicts of inter-
est (i.e., individuals are more strongly forced to share important
resources). Presumably, such repeated experiences may force
children (and parents) to develop cooperative and coordinating
interaction styles, thus adapting in a collectively beneficial man-
ner, thereby promoting prosocial orientation. The finding that
individualists reported having fewer older siblings than did pro-
socials is congruent with the prosocial-security hypothesis and
suggests that prosocial orientation is less likely to develop when
fewer siblings are around in the first couple of years.
It is interesting that prosocials reported having more sisters
than did individualists and competitors. Why is the number of
sisters (rather than brothers) related to social value orientation?
Studies 1 and 4 revealed that the prevalence of prosocials was
somewhat greater—and that of individualists somewhat
smaller—among women than among men.7 One explanation
would thus be that because sisters are more likely to be prosocial
than brothers, individuals are more likely to adopt a prosocial
orientation as the number of sisters increases (e.g., through
patterns of reciprocity or modeling). A second—and somewhat
more stereotypical—explanation would be that sisters more
than brothers adopt a mother role, a repertoire of behaviors
that involves nurturing, helping, and caring, thereby promoting
prosocial orientation in the receiver (or the observer). Although
these lines of reasoning are highly speculative, it is interesting
to note that the current findings are in agreement with a recent
finding indicating that, relative to fathers with no or a few sisters,
fathers with many sisters devote greater time to raising their
children (Duindam & Spruijt, 1996).
A third finding was that the prevalence of prosocials in-
creased—and the prevalence of individualists and competitors
decreased—with age, suggesting that differences in social value
orientation are further shaped by different interaction experi-
ences that are characteristic of early adulthood, middle adult-
hood, and old age. Why did we find support for the prosocial-
growth hypothesis (and why did we not find support for the
proself-growth hypothesis) ? Earlier, we outlined three comple-
mentary lines of reasoning. The first explanation contends that
over time and extended experience with interdependent situa-
tions and interaction partners, individuals may increasingly de-
tect the functional aspects of prosocial motivation, an account
that is congruent with the well-established finding that prosocial
behavior among children and young adults increases with age.
The second explanation assumes that the nature of interdepen-
dence situations and social interaction changes and evolves dur-
ing a lifetime, suggesting that situations over a lifetime tend to
increasingly call for tendencies toward helping others (and to
some degree, being helped by others). Such features may also
enhance prosocial orientation because they contribute to a more
varied set of interaction experiences, which may further help
individuals detect the functional aspects of prosocial orientation.
The third explanation centers on the cultural-historical determi-
nants of prosocial orientation, arguing that many societies, in-
6
 We are aware of one study that has examined whether cultural
differences in cooperativeness and competitiveness are partially ac-
counted for by family size differences (Knight & Kagan, 1982). This
study compared Anglo American and Mexican American children and
revealed greater levels of cooperation among Mexican American children
(children who were raised in larger families). However, they did not
find a link between degree of cooperativeness-competitiveness and num-
ber of siblings (or birth order). Thus, in this study, number of siblings
and birth order did not account for the differences observed between
Anglo American and Mexican American children.
7
 Social stereotypes suggest that women are considerably more proso-
cial and less competitive than are men. The current findings suggest that
in actuality such differences tend to be rather small. Also, the current
evidence in support of small differences between women and men is
consistent with research on prosocial behavior among children, which
also reveals modest differences between the genders (for a review, see
Durkin, 1995).
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eluding the Netherlands, have become less rural, less coltectivis-
tic and more urban, more individualistic over the past decades.
It should be clear that our findings do not enable us to draw
any firm conclusions regarding the relative validity of these
interrelated explanations.
It is important to note that our findings do not support the
pro self-growth hypothesis, a prediction that was based on the
notion that levels of trust may decrease with increasing age.
In retrospect, it might be questionable (a) whether individuals
continue to assign greater weight to potentially harmful behav-
ior, (b) if they do, whether individuals draw firm conclusions
about humankind on the basis of such experiences, and (c)
whether lower levels of trust necessarily translate in a movement
away from prosocial orientation (cf. Parks, 1994). It could be
that with increasing age, individuals become more prosocial,
even though they (increasingly) believe that most people are
not prosocial.
We should acknowledge several limitations of the present
research. First, the present work did not provide insight into the
nature of social interaction experiences underlying relationships
with the primary caregiver or siblings that may guide the devel-
opment of prosocial, individualistic, or competitive orientations.
In a similar vein, the present research did not directly assess
how social interaction experiences may differ as a function of
age. Indeed, future research on the developmental aspects of
social value orientations would benefit from a much needed
typology (or atlas) of social interaction experiences for individ-
uals differing in attachment style, number of siblings, and age.
A final limitation is, of course, that we have not provided insight
into the several correlates (e.g., religion, socioeconomic status)
of attachment differences, number of siblings, and age—vari-
ables that potentially contribute to furthering the understanding
of the development of social value orientation.
We wish to close by drawing attention to the finding that
the distribution of social value orientation among convenience
samples was similar to that of a sample assumed to be repre-
sentative of the Dutch adult population, so long as these sam-
ples are comparable in terms of age (i.e., 15-30 years old).
Such findings slrengthen the confidence one may have in the
generalizability of the extant literature on social value orienta-
tions. At the same time, because prosocial orientation system-
atically increases with age, studies with participants who have
not yet reached middle adulthood might lead researchers to
draw conclusions about the selfishness of human nature that
are not entirely justified. Indeed, classic principles of rational
self-interest or economic man (Luce & Raiffa, 1957; Von Neu-
man & Morgenstern, 1947) seem too limited to explain fully
the social-motivational underpinnings of social interaction
phenomena.
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Appendix
An Instrument to Measure Social Value Orientation
In this task we ask you to imagine that you have been randomly paired
with another person, whom we will refer to simply as the "Other." This
other person is someone you do not know and that you will not know-
ingly meet in the future. Both you and the "Other" person will be
making choices by circling either the letter A, B, or C. ^bur own choices
will produce points for both yourself and the "Other" person. Likewise,
the other's choice will produce points for him/her and for you. Every
point has value: The more points you receive, the better for you, and
the more points the "Other" receives, the better for him/her.
Here's an example of how this task works:
You get
Other gets
A
500
100
B
500
500
C
550
300
In this example, if you chose A you would receive 500 points and the
other would receive 100 points; if you chose B, you would receive 500
points and the other 500; and if you chose C, you would receive 550
points and the other 300. So, you see that your choice influences both
the number of points you receive and the number of points the other
receives.
Before you begin making choices, please keep in mind that there are
no right or wrong answers—choose the option that you, for whatever
reason, prefer most. Also, remember that the points have value; The
more of them you accumulate, the better for you. Likewise, from the
"other's" point of view, the more points s/he accumulates, the better
for him/her.
For each of the nine choice situations, circle A, B, or C, depending
on which column you prefer most:
A B C A B C
(1) You get 480 540 480 (6) You get 500 500 570
Other gets 80 280 480 Other gets 500 100 300
A B C A B C
(2) You get 560 500 500 (7) You get 510 560 510
Other gets 300 500 100 Other gets 510 300 110
A B C A B C
(3) \ou get 520 520 580 (8) You get 550 500 500
Other gets 520 120 320 Other gets 300 100 500
A B C A B C
(4) You get 500 560 490 (9) You get 480 490 540
Other gets 100 300 490 Other gets 100 490 300
A B C
(5) You get 560 500 490
Other gets 300 500 90
Note. Participants are classified when they make 6 or more consistent
choices. Prosocial choices are 1c, 2b, 3a, 4c, 5b, 6a. 7a, 8c, 9b; individu-
alistic choices are lb, 2a, 3c, 4b, 5a, 6c, 7b, 8a, 9c; and competitive
choices are la, 2c, 3b, 4a, 5c, 6b, 7c, 8b, 9a.
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